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MARRIAGE AND SOME TROUBLING ISSUES WITH NOFAULT DIVORCE
Peter Nash Swisher*
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having
more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other
institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature.
That body prescribes the age at which the parties may contract to
marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the
duties and obligations it creates, its effects on the property rights of
both [parties], present and prospective, and the acts which may
constitute grounds for its dissolution.
-Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888)

I. INTRODUCTION
Marriage, according to the United States Supreme Court, creates
"the most important relation in life, as having more to do with the
morals and civilization of a people than any other institution."' Thus,
despite recent academic and judicial support for various nontraditional
family alternatives, 2 a substantial majority of Americans "still marry in
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School. B.A. Amherst College
(1966); M.A. Stanford University (1967); J.D. University of California, Hastings College of
Law (1973). Parts of this article have appeared in previous publications by the author,
including, The ALl Principles:A Farewell to Fault-But What Remedy for the Egregious
Marital Misconduct of an Abusive Spouse?, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 213 (2001).
1 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring,

and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony of living, not political faiths;
a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967) (stating that marriage is "one of the basic civil rights of man" and "fundamental
to our very existence and survival").
2
See, e.g., June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist
Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953 (1991); Martha
Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?,9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 239 (2001); Martha Minow,
Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269 (1991); Nancy D.
Polikoff, Ending Marriage As We Know It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201 (2003); Marjorie
Maguire Schultz, ContractualOrderingof Marriage:A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL.
L. REV. 204 (1982); Lenore J. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and
Change, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1169 (1974); see also Symposium, A More Perfect Union: Marriage
and Marriage-LikeRelationshipsin Family Law, 30 N.M. L. REV. 1 (2000).
The author is not opposed to some nontraditional alternatives to marriage, when
appropriate, but not to the exclusion of traditional marriage. See JOHN DEWITTr GREGORY,
PETER N. SWISHER & SHERYL L. WOLF, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 29 (2d ed. 2001).
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the traditional way, and continue to regard marriage as the most
important relationship in their lives."3 Moreover, increasing criticism of
marriage in contemporary American society has generated a serious
reevaluation of the major moral, legal, social, and economic premises
underlying traditional marriage. This reassessment of marriage has led
to
to a number of strong endorsements for a rededicated commitment
4
America.
in
family
nuclear
the
and
marriage
strengthening
Like marriage, divorce or dissolution of marriage is regulated by the
state legislatures.5 Since marriage still continues to serve valuable
social, legal, economic, and institutional functions,6 the underlying
public policy in most states continues to promote marriage and
discourage divorce unless the parties strictly comply with the statutory
requirements for divorce. 7 Since the so-called "no-fault divorce
A better reasoned approach would be for more state legislatures and courts
to recognize and protect the legal rights and obligations of both traditional
and nontraditional families, as they currently coexist in American society
today, by providing alternative legal rights and remedies for each social
structure, according to the public policy of each state, and based upon the
present and future needs of all its citizens.
Id.
3
HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
26 (2d ed. 1988).
4 See, e.g., COUNCIL ON FAMILIES IN AMERICA, MARRIAGE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO
THE NATION 1 (Mar. 1995) (non-partisan council stating "[t]he time has come to shift the
focus of national attention from divorce to marriage, and to rebuild a family culture based
on enduring marital relationships"); NAT'L COMM'N ON CHILDREN: BEYOND RHETORIC: A
NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 251 (1991) (bipartisan commission
concluding that "[flamilies formed by marriage-where two caring adults are committed to
one another and to their children-provide the best environment for bringing children into
the world and supporting their growth and development."); see also LINDA J. WAITE &
MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER,
HEALTHIER, AND BETTER-OFF FINANCIALLY (2000); David Orgon Coolidge & William C.
Duncan, Reaffirming Marriage:A PresidentialPriority, 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 623
(2001); George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POLY 581
(1999); Lynne D. Wardle, The Bonds of Matrimony and the Bonds of Constitutional
Democracy, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349 (2003) (arguing that marriage is based upon a number
of fundamental core institutions within our constitutional democracy, rather than being
based on mere contractual arrangements).
5
See, e.g., Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (stating "the whole subject of
the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of [each]
State, and not to the laws of the United States"); see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 376 (1971); Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205.
6
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
7
For example, an overwhelming number of American courts still attempt to
validate the parties' marital expectations whenever possible. See, e.g., Leonard v. Leonard,
560 So. 2d 1080 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); Panzer v. Panzer, 528 P.2d 888 (N.M. 1974); CLARK,
supra note 3, at 70-75. Divorce, on the other hand, is in derogation of the common law and
divorce statutes therefore must be strictly complied with. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 299
S.E.2d 351 (Va. 1983); see also CLARK, supra note 3, at 405-12; JOYCE HENS GREEN ET AL.,
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 4-53 (1986).
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revolution" of the 1970s, however, a growing number of commentators
have largely discounted the role of fault in American divorce law, 8 as
well as a spouse's non-economic contributions to the well-being of the
family in determining spousal support on divorce, the equitable
distribution of marital property on divorce, or both. 9
The purpose of this Article is to challenge these erroneous
assumptions, that fault is "no longer an issue" in modem American
divorce law, and that a spouse on divorce should not be compensated for
his or her non-economic contributions to the marriage and to the wellbeing of the family.
II. NO-FAULT DIVORCE AND FAULT-BASED DIVORCE ALTERNATIVES
A The No-Fault Divorce "Revolution"and Its Unexpected Consequences
Divorce reform in America is currently at a crossroads. 10 Prior to
California's landmark 1969 no-fault divorce legislation, a growing
number of lawyers, judges, sociologists, and legislators had been
dissatisfied with various perceived defects in America's fault-based
divorce system. They argued that divorce should not be based solely on
traditional fault grounds such as adultery, cruelty, and desertion, but
instead divorce should be viewed as a regrettable, but necessary, legal
definition of marital failure where often the factors leading to the
marriage breakdown were caused by the parties' incompatibility and
irreconcilable differences.1 1 Moreover, under a fault-based divorce
system, couples in unhappy marriages might have to fabricate the
necessary fault grounds for divorce and resort to perjury, 12 or attempt to
13
use questionable migratory divorces from sister state "divorce mills."

8
See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic
Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 719; Ira Mark
Ellman, The Placeof Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 773 (1996); Herma
Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1987); Norman B. Lichenstein, MaritalMisconduct and the Allocation of
FinancialResources at Divorce: A Farewellto Fault, 54 UMKC L. REV. 1 (1985).
9
See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2000) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES] (proposing a purely financially-based

"true" no-fault divorce regime); Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1989) (same).
10 See, e.g., DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma
Hill Kay eds., 1990); MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE,
LAw, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989).
11 See, e.g., MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW (1972).

12 See, e.g., Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L.
REV. 32 (1966).
13

See generally NELSON BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE

UNITED STATES (1962).
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No-fault divorce legislation in the United States, 14 therefore, was
originally intended to be a good faith remedy to many of these perceived
evils and shortcomings inherent in a fault-based divorce regime. 15
Yet America's no-fault divorce "revolution" over the past thirty-five
years has developed some very serious shortcomings of its own. In
addition to a soaring divorce rate in the 1970s when no-fault divorce was
first introduced in most states, 16 a disturbing number of courts have
failed to provide adequate financial protection to many women and
children of divorce.17 Additionally, many children of divorce have
suffered long-lasting psychological and economic damage resulting from
divorce.' 8 Indeed, some commentators have concluded that the no-fault

14
Section 302(a)(2) of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides that a court
shall enter a divorce or dissolution of marriage whenever
the court finds that a marriage is irretrievably broken, if the finding is
supported by evidence that (i) the parties have lived separate and apart for a
period of more than 180 days next preceding the commencement of the [divorce]
proceeding, or (ii) there is serious marital discord adversely affecting the
attitude of one or both of the parties toward the marriage.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 302, 9A U.L.A. 200 (1987).
Currently, all fifty states have some sort of no-fault divorce alternative, either based
upon the parties' separation for a specified period of time or upon their irreconcilable
differences or incompatibility. See generally Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review
of the Year in Family Law: Children's Issues Remain the Focus, 37 FAM. L.Q. 527, 580
(2004).
15 See generally Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault
Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269, 270-76 (1997).
16 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 3, at 410. "The social change of greatest importance
has been the sharp growth in the divorce rate, which reached its highest point in 1979, and
which has fluctuated somewhat since then." Id.
17 See, e.g., James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of
Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 405 (1987) ("An end to the systemized
impoverishment of women and children by the divorce regime must be one of the foremost
items on the nation's new agenda."); see also LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND
CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); Lenore J. Weitzman & Ruth B. Dixon, The Alimony Myth:
Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Difference?, 14 FAM. L.Q. 141 (1980). Although the accuracy
of Professor Weitzman's statistical studies has been questioned, other studies have
corroborated this "feminization of poverty" resulting from divorce. For example, according
to 1996 data from the Social Science Research Council in New York City, a woman's
standard of living declines by 30% on average the first year after a divorce, while a man's
standard of living rises by 10%. Elizabeth Gleick, Hell Hath No Fury, TIME, Oct. 7, 1996, at
84.
18 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and
Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 29 (1990) ("There is substantial evidence that the process of
going through their parents' divorce and resulting changes in their lives are psychologically
costly for most children"); see generally JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE,
SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1989)
(discussing the negative long-term effects of divorce on children); JUDITH WALLERSTEIN ET
AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY (2000) (same).
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divorce revolution in America "has failed." 9 Consequently, a growing
number of courts and commentators have been reassessing whether
fault-based factors may still serve a legitimate function and purpose in
contemporary American divorce law. 20 Likewise, a growing number of
state legislatures have been reassessing the role of fault in contemporary
divorce law as they provide for the concurrent goals of protecting,
21
promoting, and "reinstitutionalizing" traditional marriage.
19 See, e.g., COUNCIL ON FAMILIES IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 1.
The divorce revolution-the steady displacement of a marriage culture by a
culture of divorce and unwed parenthood-has failed. It has created
terrible hardships for children, incurred unsupportable social costs, and
failed to deliver on its promise of greater adult happiness. The time has
come to shift the focus of national attention from divorce to marriage and to
rebuild a family culture based on enduring marital relationships.
Id.
20 See, e.g., Allen M. Parkman, Reforming Divorce Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
379 (2001); Jana B. Singer, Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital:Why the Shoe Won't Fit,
31 FAM. L.Q. 119 (1997); Peter Nash Swisher, The ALI Principles:A Farewell to Fault-But
What Remedy for the Egregious Marital Misconduct of an Abusive Spouse?, 8 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 213 (2001); Swisher, supra note 15; Lynne D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce
and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies,
and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525 (1994);
Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Comment, Fault: A Viable Means of Re-injecting Responsibility in
Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605 (1996); see also Harvey J. Golden & J. Michael
Taylor, Fault Enforces Accountability, FAM. ADVOC. Fall 1987, at 11; R. Michael Redman,
Coming Down Hard on No-FaultDivorce, FAM. ADvoC. Fall 1987, at 6.
21 See, e.g., SCOTT M. STANLEY & HOwARD J. MARKMAN, UNIV. OF DENVER CTR. FOR
MARITAL & FAMILY STUDIES, CAN GOVERNMENT RESCUE MARRIAGE? 1-2 (June 1997),
available at http://www.aamft.orglPressRoom/Press-releases/viewpoints.asp (last visited
Feb. 19, 2005).
There is a trend sweeping the country to make changes in legal codes
to strengthen and stabilize marriages. There are two key thrusts emerging
in state legislatures: the first involves changes in laws that would make it
harder for couples to divorce; the second involves efforts to encourage or
mandate couples to participate in premarital counseling.
While strange bedfellows, there is a growing consensus among both
liberal and conservative political and religious leaders that something must
be done.
Id. Examples of such legislation include "covenant marriage" statutes in Arizona and
Louisiana where the parties consensually agree not to obtain a no-fault divorce, and to only
dissolve their marriage based upon traditional fault grounds or separation for a period of
time. The couple also agrees to obtain premarital counseling prior to marriage. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 25-901 (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-224 (West 2000). The Florida
legislature also passed the sweeping bipartisan Marriage Preparation and Preservation
Act, providing that: (1) all Florida high school students are required to take a course in
"marriage and relationship skill-based education"; (2) engaged couples are encouraged, but
not required, to take a "premarital education course"; (3) couples applying for a marriage
license will receive a handbook prepared by the Florida State Bar Association informing
them of "the rights and responsibilities under Florida law of marital partners to each other
and to their children, both during marriage and upon dissolution"; and (4) couples filing for
divorce that have children must take a "Parent Education and Family Stabilization
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B. Fault-BasedAlternatives in ContemporaryAmerican Divorce Law
When no-fault divorce legislation was enacted in all fifty states
during the 1970s and 1980s, a number of commentators were perhaps
too quick to bid their final, not-so-fond farewell to fault-based divorce
factors.22 Professor Homer Clark, for example, stated in 1988 that
[tioday, the non-fault grounds of marriage breakdown,
incompatibility and living separate and apart, have been enacted in
almost all states. It is thus fair to say that there is now wide
agreement that fault no longer should be relevant in determining
whether or not a marriage should be dissolved, even though the fault
grounds continue to exist in some states. Since most of the
traditional defenses to divorce are logically related to fault in some
way, it is also true that they have been largely abolished or ignored
today in those states in which the non-fault grounds for divorce
23
prevail.
Other commentators, including Professor Ira Mark Ellman,
continue to erroneously state that fault factors on divorce are only
considered in a "small minority" of states today. 24 But to paraphrase
Mark Twain, rumors of the demise of fault-based divorce law in America
have been greatly exaggerated. In fact, a majority of states today still
retain fault-based divorce alternatives in addition to enacting no-fault
divorce legislation. 25 Today, a majority of states-approximately twentyeight-still consider marital fault factors in determining spousal support
and the distribution of marital property.2 6 And a majority of statesapproximately thirty-two-still retain alternative fault grounds for
dissolving the marital relationship. 27 Indeed, the number of states that
have adopted fault-based statutory factors for divorce has increased
Course" that covers the legal and emotional impact of divorce on both adults and children,
financial responsibility, laws regarding child abuse and neglect, and conflict resolution
skills. Mike McManus, FloridaPasses Nation's Most Sweeping Reform of MarriageLaw,
ETHIcs & RELIGION, May 16, 1998, available at httpJ/www.smartmarriages.com/
mcmanusflorida.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2005) (predicting that the statute would inspire
many other states to pass similar legislation).
22 See, e.g., supra note 8, and accompanying text.
23 CLARK, supra note 3, at 496.
24 Ira Mark Ellman, Should the Theory of Alimony Include NonfinancialLosses and
Motivations?, 1991 BYU L. REV. 259, 262.
25 See, e.g., Golden & Taylor, supra note 20, at 12.
[Various] critics . . . mistakenly believe that the adoption of no-fault

[divorce] grounds by every state in the union heralds a beneficial end to the
fault system. This is simply not true because most states have incorporated
no-fault grounds into their traditional framework, not substituted one
system for the other.
Id.
26
27

See, e.g., Elrod & Spector, supra note 14, at 576, 581.
Id. at 580.
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rather than decreased over the past ten years. 28 Thus, as Adriaen Morse
Jr. observes:
Dismissing fault from consideration [in American divorce law] because
it is a factor in only a "small minority" of states seems almost
ludicrous in view of the facts [since] many legislatures have not been
so overcome by the charms of no-fault [divorce] as to wish to repeal the
fault remedies entirely. Thus, in this area, Professor Ellman has
failed to honestly consider whether moral relations should be factored
into alimony [and factored into other important
aspects of American
29
divorce law]. A shrug is not an argument.
This same criticism can be leveled at the American Law Institute's
(ALI) Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (Principles)and its
rather curt and unpersuasive dismissal of the role of marital fault in the
dissolution of marriage. For example, Comment e to Section 4:09 of the
Principles excludes marital misconduct factors in the distribution of
marital property and spousal support, purportedly justifying the rule as
being "consistent with the prevailing trend in the law since the 1970
approval of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act."30 However, only a
small minority of states have adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act to date, and only a minority of states-about fifteen-are "true" nofault divorce jurisdictions. 31 Thus, if there is an arguable majority
"trend" today, it is to retain fault factors in divorce as one of many
statutory factors that state courts will still consider in determining
spousal support rights, the division of marital property, or both.
Why this strong and continuing legislative and judicial recognition
of fault-based divorce factors, despite the general abandonment and
premature dismissal of nonfinancial fault factors by many academic
scholars and the ALI Principlesof the Law of Family Dissolution? This
may be explained by the strong public policy rationale underlying
marriage and divorce in a majority of states today-that moral issues
still do matter in a family law context,3 2 and state legislatures and courts
still do take into account the responsibility and accountability of the

28 For example, Elrod and Walker reported in 1994 that twenty-four states still
considered marital fault in awarding alimony, and thirty states retained alternative fault
grounds for dissolving a marriage. See Linda D. Elrod & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law
in the Fifty States, 27 FAM. L.Q. 515, 534, 661 (1994). Currently, these figures are twentyeight states and thirty-two states respectively. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying
text.
29 Morse, supra note 20, at 638.
30 PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at § 4.09 cmt. e.
31 See Elrod & Spector, supra note 14, at 580.
32

See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformationof American

Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1803 (1985).
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respective spouses, especially when one spouse is guilty of serious and
egregious marital misconduct.3 3 Again, as Adriaen Morse Jr. aptly notes:
The whole notion of fault proves to be a stumbling block for many
scholars writing about the current pursuit of equitable ways of dealing
with alimony [and with the division of marital property on divorce].
However, as noted earlier, fault provides an excellent tool to encourage
the type of behavior society believes to be appropriate in marriage,
and to discourage that behavior which society deems to be
inappropriate. It seems that most people would at least agree that
engaging in adultery, cruelty, or desertion is not the sort of sharing
behavior which marriage should have to endure. In order to provide a
disincentive for such behavior, there should be concomitant, postfinancial consequences for engaging in inappropriate
divorce 34
behavior.
Accordingly, as will be discussed in more detail below, fault factors
in contemporary American divorce law still serve a legitimate purpose
for the following three reasons: (1) other no-fault laws, including no-fault
workers compensation, automobile insurance, and strict liability tort
laws, all have incorporated a number of fault-based remedies within
their no-fault statutory framework for serious and egregious conduct,
and American divorce law likewise should retain fault-based remedies
for serious and egregious marital misconduct; (2) a substantial number
of states continue to recognize and use a number of fault-based statutory
factors on divorce for determining spousal support and the division of
marital property, and state court judges generally have applied these
fault-based statutory remedies in a realistic and responsible manner;
and (3) alternative tort or criminal law remedies for serious and
egregious marital misconduct have proven to be inadequate in theory
and practice.
C. Arguments for Retaining FaultFactorsin American Divorce Law
Various commentators,3 5 and the American Law Institute's
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution36 have argued for "consistent
and predictable" no-fault family law principles relating to compensatory
spousal support and the division of marital property on divorce.3 7 They
have argued that these should be based solely on no-fault financial
principles and objectives, to the exclusion of any nonfinancial spousal
33 See, e.g., Golden & Taylor, supra note 20, at 12 ("Very few states totally ignore
fault [in divorce proceedings]. That is because we are brought up to believe that people
should be held accountable for their actions, and that courts should establish such
accountability and consider it."); see also infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
34 See Morse, supra note 20, at 640-41.
35 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
36 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
37 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 23-25.
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contributions to the marriage and the well-being of the family, and to the
38
exclusion of any fault-based factors such as marital misconduct.
For example, in his article, The Theory of Alimony, 39 the Principles'
Chief Reporter, Professor Ira Mark Ellman, argued for a purely financial
and compensatory no-fault approach to spousal support or alimony.
Basically, Ellman's theory of alimony conceptualized spousal support as
compensation earned by the economically disadvantaged spouse
(normally the wife) through marital investments and as a means to
eliminate distorting financial incentives in marriage, rather than as a
40
way to relieve financial need as current alimony law generally allows.
However, Ellman's theory of alimony has been criticized by other
commentators for not recognizing important nonfinancial losses of
divorce as well. Professor June Carbone faults Ellman for ignoring larger
noneconomic societal interests such as child-rearing, married women's
participation in the work force, a return of appropriate benefits that the
other spouse retains on divorce, and sex-equality issues. 41 Professor Carl
Schneider criticizes Ellman for his refusal to acknowledge any moral
discourse on the subject of awarding alimony on divorce. 42 Schneider also
disagrees with Ellman's reasoning that the modern divorce reform
movement in America has allegedly "rejected" all fault-based divorce
standards by noting that fault is still taken into account in many
jurisdictions in awarding alimony, 43 and that a broader view of alimony
44
still requires a great deal of traditional judicial discretion by the courts.
Similar criticism has been leveled at the ALI Principles' no-fault
approach to alimony, its no-fault approach to the division of marital
property, and its failure to take into account many other important noneconomic societal interests on divorce. 45 In spite of explicit arguments
and proposals made in the Principles to the contrary, forty-two states
today continue to recognize a spouse's non-economic contributions to the
marriage and to the well-being of the family in determining spousal
support and the division of marital property. 46 Indeed, if contemporary
See id.
Ellman, supra note 9, at 3.
40 Id. at 50-52.
41 June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention ofAlimony: A Reply to
Ira Eliman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463 (1990).
42 Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: MaritalDecision and Moral Discourse,
1991 BYU L. REV. 197.
43 Id. at 249-50.
44 Id. at 252-53.
45 See, e.g., Katherine Silbaugh, Gender and Nonfinancial Matters in the ALI
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 203 (2001);
Swisher, supra note 20; see also Francis J. Canania, Jr., Learning From the Process of
Decision: The ParentingPlan,2001 BYU L. REV. 857.
46 See, e.g., Elrod & Spector, supra note 14, at 580.
38

39
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marriage is viewed today as a shared partnership with important
economic and non-economic expectations, 47 then a "true" no-fault divorce
regime, as proposed in the Principles, reduces marriage on dissolution to
nothing more than impersonal and unrealistic economic calculations,
marital
and refuses to consider the many important nonmonetary
48
family.
the
of
well-being
the
to
spouse
a
contributions of
In sum, a majority of state legislatures and state courts still do
continue to recognize that under Anglo-American law, morality, social
custom, and Benjamin Cardozo's "accepted standards of right conduct,"
one is still held to the standard of being legally responsible and
accountable for one's actions, 49 whether such actions arise under
criminal law,50 tort law, 51 or family law52 principles.
1. Other no-fault laws offer fault-based remedies
It is true that, beginning in the 1920s with no-fault workers
compensation laws, and followed in the 1970s and 1980s by no-fault
automobile insurance, products liability, and divorce laws, remedial nofault legislation in a substantial number of states provided certain
economic benefits to an injured or wronged party by partially alleviating
the traditional burden of proof to demonstrate the other party's fault or
unreasonable conduct. However, none of these remedial no-fault laws
47 See, e.g., Joan Krauskopf & Rhonda Thomas, PartnershipMarriage:The Solution
to an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1974); Marcia
O'Kelly, Entitlements to Spousal Support After Divorce, 61 N.D. L. REV. 225 (1985).
48 See, e.g., Carbone, supra note 41; Woodhouse, supra note 20, at 2567; see also
KAREN WINNER, DIVORCED FROM JUSTICE 30-31 (1996).
49 See, e.g., BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921)
("[L]ogic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of right conduct,
are the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of the law."); OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 37 (1923) (observing that the various forms of legal
liability started from a moral basis, and from the concept that someone was legally
responsible and accountable for his or her conduct).
50 See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 1.2(d)-1.3(c) (4th ed. 2003).
51 See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 1, at 5-7 (5th
ed. 1984).
52 See, e.g., GREEN ETAL., supra note 7, at 15-27.
In tort, the law provides a remedy for intentional actions which cause
harm, for negligent actions which result in harm, and even for some
activities where no proof of negligence is necessary, such as product
liability. Only in the dissolution of marriage does the law currently seem to
ignore even the most egregious of actions by a person toward his or her
spouse and provide no compensation for the action.... Marriage is the only
relationship in which a party may blithely wreak havoc upon another's life
only to have the law shield the behavior through no-fault divorce rather
than deter the behavior as it did in the past. Where there is fault, there
should be consequence.
Morse, supra note 20, at 641-42.
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totally abolished or abrogated a defendant's legal responsibility and
accountability for serious and egregious misconduct.
For example, although a majority of states have adopted some form
of no-fault automobile insurance legislation, these statutes are not
completely no-fault in nature. Up to a statutory threshold, which is
often quite low, an insured automobile driver or passenger cannot sue
another driver for personal injuries resulting from a motor vehicle
accident. Rather, an injured party must look to his or her own insurance
company for compensation. However, certain statutorily-prescribed
injuries, including death, disfigurement, permanent loss of a bodily
function, and property damage normally are exempt from this no-fault
cap. 53 Indeed, some commentators now refer to no-fault automobile
54
insurance statutes as "partial tort exemption statutes."
statutes,
under no-fault workers compensation
Moreover,
intentional self-injuries will still bar a worker's claim, while egregious
employer conduct can lead to an enhanced compensation award, or the
right to sue the employer for an intentional tort in addition to obtaining
a workers' compensation award. 55 Also, in products liability litigation,
the strict tort liability actions that were formerly embraced by many
American jurisdictions in the 1970s now approximate a negligence
foreseeability standard with regard to defective design and defective
warning cases,5 6 with the conduct of the consumer always being
relevant.57
2. States still use fault when determining spousal support and property
division
Likewise, the no-fault divorce laws in a substantial number of
American states are not truly no-fault in nature, since approximately
thirty-two states currently retain various fault-based grounds for divorce
while also affording no-fault alternatives. Additionally, marital fault is

53 See, e.g., EMERiC FISCHER & PETER SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW §
5.03, at 511-16 (2d ed. 1994); ROBERT KEETON & ALAN WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 4.10
(1988).
54 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 53, at 421-25.
5 See generally Jean C. Love, Punishment and Deterrence:A Comparative Study of
Tort Liability for Punitive Damages Under No-Fault Compensation Legislation, 16 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 231 (1983).
56 See, e.g., Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From
Negligence (to Warranty) to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980);
Peter Nash Swisher, Products Liability Tort Reform: Why Virginia Should Adopt the
Henderson-Twerski ProposedRevision of Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts, 27 U.
RICH. L. REv. 857 (1993); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2

(1998).
57

See, e.g., HENRY WOODS, COMPARATIvE FAULT § 1:11 (2d ed. 1987).
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still a relevant statutory factor in at least twenty-eight states for
58
determining alimony and the division of marital property on divorce.
3. Neither tort nor criminal law provides an adequate remedy for
egregious marital misconduct
Finally, the absence of any fault-based statutory relief for egregious
marital misconduct may place an almost insurmountable burden on an
abused spouse to obtain compensatory relief from an abusive spouse.
This serious problem is illustrated in a number of cases in a minority of
states that have adopted a "pure" or "true" no-fault regime, 59 where nonfinancial marital fault no longer plays any significant role in
determining divorce grounds and defenses, spousal support awards, or
the equitable distribution of marital property. 60 For example, in the case
of In re Koch,61 the Oregon Court of Appeals rejected a wife's claim for
support based upon injuries that she sustained in a severe physical
altercation with her husband. The court stated that, under Oregon law,
fault could not be considered as a factor in dividing the parties' marital
property or in awarding spousal support. 62 Two other "pure" or "true" nofault states also have held that the murder or attempted murder of one
spouse by the other spouse would have no effect whatsoever on the
division of the parties' marital property, or any spousal support award,
since such awards can only be based on the financial needs of the
63
parties, regardless of fault.
A better-reasoned approach would recognize fault-based exceptions
in both "pure" or "true" no-fault divorce regimes and in "modified" or
"alternative" no-fault divorce regimes for serious and egregious marital
misconduct, in order to protect and compensate an abused spouse for the
egregious acts of an abusive spouse. For example, in Stover v. Stover,64
the Arkansas Supreme Court allowed an unequal division of marital
property where the wife was found guilty of conspiring to kill her
husband. Similarly, in Brabac v. Brabac,6 5 the Wisconsin Court of
See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
Approximately fifteen states have taken this approach. However, thirty-five
years after the so-called no-fault divorce 'revolution," this is not a significant majority of
states, in spite of many erroneous claims to the contrary.
60 See, e.g., Boseman v. Boseman, 107 Cal. Rptr. 232 (Ct. App. 1973); Erlandson v.
Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 1982). These courts are only able to take into account
'economic fault" such as dissipation, concealment, or waste of marital assets. See, e.g.,
Ivancovich v. Ivancovich, 540 P.2d 718 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
61 In re Koch, 648 P.2d 406 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
62 Id. at 408.
63 See Mosbarger v. Mosbarger, 547 So. 2d 188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); In re
Marriage of Cihak, 416 N.E.2d 701 (Il. App. Ct. 1981).
r4 Stover v. Stover, 696 S.W.2d 750 (Ark. 1985).
65 Brabac v. Brabac, 510 N.W.2d 762 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
58

59
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Appeals held that marital fault might still be considered in a murder-forhire scheme during the pendency of a divorce. Of course, fault-based
divorce factors are not limited only to murder-for-hire schemes, and
6
would apply to any serious and egregious marital misconduct. e Thus, in
cases involving flagrant adultery or cruelty, the wife (or husband) may
still receive a greater share of the marital property. This way, egregious
marital fault would give a less empowered wife greater leverage to
negotiate a more equitable divorce settlement and would also give
7
additional means of adequately providing for herself and her children6
A second criticism of contemporary fault-based divorce factors is
that the imposition of fault-based behavioral standards on divorce "must
rely upon trial court discretion" and "the moral standards by which
blameworthy conduct will be identified and punished will vary from
judge to judge, as each judge necessarily relies on his or her own version
of appropriate behavior in intimate relationships."8 Therefore, such
judicial discretion "seems inherently limitless if no finding of economic
69
harm to the claimant is required to justify the award or its amount."
This erroneous and largely unsubstantiated argument can be questioned
on three major grounds. First, family court judges, from their equity
heritage as triers of both fact and law, have always possessed broad- 70
and necessary-judicial discretion in adjudicating family law disputes.
Second, judicial discretion is not "inherently limitless" because judges
71
are constrained by various enumerated statutory factors on divorce, as
See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 20, at 2550.
My colleague, Professor Demie Kurz, interviewed 129 women of many
races, ages, and classes, investigating their stories about why their
marriages ended in divorce for her forthcoming book on divorce, ForRicher,
For Poorer. Over half of the women in Kurz's study, and up to eighty
percent of those in working class and lower class marriages, told narratives
of husbands who abused alcohol and drugs, slept with other women, beat
and raped their wives and children, and actually or constructively
abandoned the home.... In the terminology of fault and no-fault [divorce],
the typical woman in Kurz's study stated a prima facie case for a fault66

based divorce ....

How many of these women nevertheless see their

marriages end with a judgment that forces the sale of the [marital] home
for "equitable" distribution to their abusers?
Id.
67
68
69

See WErrZMAN, supra note 17, at 14; WINNER, supra note 48, at 31-34.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 25, 50.

Id.

70 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 3, at 644 ("It is axiomatic that the trial courts have
wide discretion in determining the propriety and the amount of alimony."). This judicial
discretion also applies to the classification, valuation, and distribution of marital property
on divorce, id. at 589-94, and to child custody determinations, where parental conduct and
fitness are always relevant factors in any child custody dispute. Id. at 796-806.
71 One of the strongest arguments against the Principles' concern regarding
"inherently limitless" judicial discretion is the fact that most fault-sensitive jurisdictions
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well as by appellate review for any abuse of judicial discretion. 72 Third,
the current trend in many state courts is to ignore or severely limit the
effect of any fault-based divorce factors, except in serious and egregious
circumstances.

73

Thus, it is fair to say that a substantial number of states still
continue to recognize and use a number of fault-based statutory factors
for serious and egregious marital misconduct, and that state court judges
generally have applied these fault-based remedies in a realistic and
responsible manner. As Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse aptly
observes:
I agree with the ALI's Draft description of the complexities and
challenges of the judging process, but not with the faint-hearted
conclusion that judges are incapable of trying cases that depend on
assessing the reasonableness of conduct in a given context or on
calculating intangibles. We have learned to calculate "goodwill" in a
business enterprise, to place a dollar value on an accident victim's
pain, to judge corporate directors' fidelity in complex takeover
negotiations, and to calibrate punitive damages to deter misconduct in
many spheres. There is no reason why courts cannot undertake
74
similar inquiries in the area of marital fault.
75
7 6 both argue that any
Finally, Professor Ellman and the ALI Principles
compensation for nonfinancial loss arising from the other spouse's
egregious marital misconduct is "better left" to a separate criminal law
or tort remedy, and that there "is no reason to reinvent compensation
principles under the rubric of fault adjudication, nor to incorporate tort
77
principles into divorce adjudications."
Professor Ellman and the Principles are correct in asserting that
there is no reason to "reinvent compensation principles" under the rubric
of fault adjudication, but for an entirely different reason. Fault
adjudication in divorce already exists in a majority of American
now recognize marital fault as only one of many statutory factors that must be taken into
consideration by the trial court judge in determining appropriate spousal support and
marital property division on divorce. See, e.g., Sparks v. Sparks, 485 N.W.2d 893 (Mich.
1992) (holding that marital misconduct is only one of many statutory factors that a court
must properly consider in awarding spousal support or a division of marital property);
accord Tarro v. Tarro, 485 A.2d 558 (R.I. 1984); Rexrode v. Rexrode, 339 S.E.2d 544 (Va.
Ct. App. 1986).
72 See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 696 P.2d 1386 (Kan. 1985); Blank v. Blank, 389 S.E.2d
723 (Va. Ct. App. 1990); Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707 (Wyo. 1980).
73 See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 230 S.E.2d 272 (Ga. 1976); Platt v. Platt, 728
S.W.2d 542 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Thames v. Thames, 477 N.W.2d 496 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991);
Perlberger v. Perlberger, 626 A.2d 1186 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Williams v. Williams, 415
S.E.2d 252 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
74 Woodhouse, supra note 20, at 2560.
75 See Ellman, supra note 8, at 807-08.
76 PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 57-66.
Id. at 53.

77
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jurisdictions today, based upon a number of strong underlying public
policy reasons, so fault adjudication in divorce, in a majority of states,
need not be "reinvented." The Principles, however, incorrectly attempts
to characterize nonfmancial fault-based compensatory remedies only in
terms of assault and battery, or tortuous infliction of emotional
distress. 78 While serious and egregious marital misconduct may well
include these acts as well as spousal abuse, domestic violence, and
attempted murder,7 9 it is not limited solely to physical or mental cruelty;
adultery that substantially contributes to the dissolution of a marriage is
also recognized as a relevant fault-based factor in a substantial majority
of jurisdictions.80 Yet, as the Principles concedes, emotional distress
actions based upon the other spouse's adultery are generally not
actionable as an independent tort action,81 nor have many independent
tort cases been deemed "outrageous" enough to qualify as intentional
82
infliction of emotional distress.
Although appellate opinions "may suggest that there are a vast
number of tort cases associated with divorce, in practice there are
relatively few cases that are actually brought, and even fewer when
there has been an actual recovery."8 3 Thus, as Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse observes:
Tort claims for marital misconduct have severe drawbacks ...
Because they are treated with suspicion as neither divorce claims nor
classic forms of tort, tort remedies for spousal misconduct are often
denied or restricted by courts accustomed to no-fault ideology of
marriage dissolution. They [also] raise tricky questions of resjudicata
and collateral estoppel, the right to a jury trial, overlapping recoveries,
and limitations on damages. These issues

78

. . .

currently must be

Id. at 54-64.

79 See, e.g., Marriage of Sommers, 792 P.2d 1005 (Kan. 1990); Brancovenau v.

Brancovenau, 535 N.Y.S.2d 86 (App. Div. 1988); Brabec v. Brabec, 510 N.W.2d 762 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1993).
80 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-1 (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34
(West 1998); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701(b)(14) (West 2001).

81 PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 56; see, e.g., Strauss v. Cilek, 418 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1987); Poston v. Poston, 436 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Alexander v. Inman,
825 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
82 See, e.g., Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 901 P.2d 986 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Dye v. Gainey,
463 S.E.2d 97 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
83 Robert G. Spector, Marital Torts: The Current Legal Landscape, 33 FAM. L.Q.
745, 762 (1999). Among the reasons for not bringing such marital tort cases are that
.practically all clients show a distaste for the prolonging of a process that a civil case would
entail" and "homeowner insurance policies no longer cover intentional torts. Therefore only
where the tort defendant has sufficient assets to satisfy the judgment is a case viable."
Finally, "the family law bar is rather inexperienced in the personal injury area." Id. at 76263.
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resolved by judges addressing individual cases in a8 4piecemeal fashion
and confined to the analytical structure of tort laws.
The Principles therefore advocate an independent tort action for serious
and egregious marital misconduct that is both costly and duplicative,
rarely used by the spouses in a successful manner, and does not provide
an adequate or realistic remedy for serious and egregious marital
misconduct. It also raises a number of largely unresolved procedural
issues as to exactly how such an independent tort action should be
brought. The better-reasoned approach, used in the majority of states
today, is to retain and utilize economic and noneconomic fault factors on
divorce in order to determine fair and adequate spousal support awards,
and the equitable distribution of marital property on divorce, whenever a
spouse has been guilty of serious and egregious marital misconduct.
III. CONCLUSION
Since the so-called no-fault divorce "revolution" of the 1970s, a
number of commentators have largely discounted the role of fault in
contemporary American divorce law. Likewise, the American Law
Institute's proposed Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (2000)
dismisses the role of marital fault in the dissolution of marriage, as well
as any other noneconomic contribution of a spouse to the marriage and
the well-being of the family.
What these commentators largely ignore, however, is that thirtyfive years after the so-called no-fault divorce "revolution," only a small
minority of states-about fifteen-are "true" no-fault jurisdictions, while
a majority of states still retain alternative fault grounds for divorce, and
still consider marital fault factors in determining spousal support and
the distribution of marital property on divorce. 85 Indeed, forty-two states
still continue to evaluate a spouse's noneconomic contributions to the
marriage and the well-being of the family, in spite of the Principles'
arguments to the contrary. 86 This continuing legislative and judicial
recognition of fault-based divorce factors may be explained by the strong
public policy rationale underlying marriage and divorce in a majority of
states-that moral issues still do matter in family law, and that states
still do take into account the actions of the respective spouses on divorce,
especially when one spouse is guilty of serious and egregious marital
misconduct.
Accordingly, fault factors in contemporary American divorce law
still do serve a legitimate purpose and function for three reasons. First,
other no-fault laws such as workers compensation, automobile

84
85
86

Woodhouse, supranote 20, at 2566.
See Elrod & Spector, supra note 14, at 580.
Id.

HeinOnline -- 17 Regent U. L. Rev. 258 2004-2005

2005]

MARRIAGE AND NO-FAULT DIVORCE

259

insurance, and strict liability torts have incorporated fault-based
remedies within their no-fault statutory framework for serious and
egregious conduct, and American divorce law should continue to do the
same. Second, a substantial number of states continue to recognize and
use a number of fault-based statutory factors on divorce for determining
spousal support and the division of marital property, and state courts
have generally applied these fault-based statutory remedies in a
responsible manner. Finally, alternative tort or criminal law remedies
for serious and egregious marital misconduct have proven to be
inadequate in theory and practice.
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